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Abstract 
Local elites in developing African countries, the so-called Traditional Authorities, still hold considerable 
power over rural communities, namely they are likely to have a decisive influence on their voting behavior. 
This study measures this influence using data collected through a field experiment for Aker, Collier and 
Vicente (2011) during the Mozambican elections of 2009 in 161 locations. The results obtained point to a 
positive correlation between a set of indicators of the power of Traditional Authorities and both voter turnout 
and the vote for Frelimo, the incumbent.  
Keywords: Traditional Authorities, Voting Behavior, Political Economy, Mozambique. 
1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that institutions are a relevant factor for economic development. Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001) argue that worse performing institutions, namely deficiencies on property rights 
protection, are at the root of the lagging economic performance of developing countries. Democracy is 
generally believed to be the solution to this problem, assuring the proper functioning of institutions through a 
system of checks and balances which ensures the accountability of the ones in power. However, even 
democratic systems are subject to wide range of problems, such as corruption or clientelism, in particular in 
societies characterized by the low levels of information of their citizens. This seems to be the case in most 
developing countries where democracy is in place. 
Mozambique seems to suit this description. The evolution of democracy in this country, since 1994, has 
been marked by a sharp reduction in turnout from one election to the other, and by an increasing hegemony 
of the former single party, Frelimo. Mattes and Shenga (2007) describe the Mozambican society as largely 
“uncritical” and uninformed, where most citizens seem unable to issue opinions on political matters while 
the few that can tend to have “extremely positive views”. In such a scenario, electors are highly susceptible 
of being manipulated or even coerced when it comes to express their will in the defining moments of a 
democracy, the elections. 
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The present work seeks to assess the influence of local elites on the voting behavior of rural communities. In 
rural Mozambique, elites are formed by traditional authorities who have responsibility over matters as 
diverse as the allocation of land, the resolution of conflicts between community members or even the 
collection of taxes. These figures, banished by Frelimo after the independence of the country in 1975 never 
disappeared. In fact, during the civil war, the “Chiefs” were among the most important bases of support of 
Renamo, the opposition movement. Oddly or not, the same party that had banished them in the first place, 
Frelimo, reinstated their power in 2000, after the particularly disputed elections of 1999. This move was, 
most likely, a consequence of their influence on the electoral behavior of the respective communities. 
Notwithstanding, this influence was never quantified. That is precisely the aim of this study. 
The data base used for this purpose was collected through the field experiment conducted for Aker, Collier 
and Vicente (2011) during the general elections of 2009. The experiment comprised three different 
interventions of voter education, spread across 161 locations (including the control group) in the provinces 
of Cabo Delgado, Zambezia, Gaza and Maputo-Province. The post-election questionnaire, which is used in 
this study, included 1154 randomly selected respondents with access to cell-phones (required by the 
interventions). In this questionnaire, the respondents reported whether they voted or not and the 
party/candidate in which they voted for (our outcome variables). In addition to this, they were asked to report 
a wide range of information about the Leaders of their communities (the main explanatory variables). This 
information included the responsibility of the Leaders over several matters (e.g. land allocation, distribution 
of food), the repondents’ dependence and agreement with their decisions and whether they usually assisted 
the community in solving problems, measures which might be understood as proxies of the Chiefs’ power. 
Additionally, they were asked to report whether they had met the chief or his deputy on election day which 
are potential measures of the direct interference of the Leaders during the election. Finally, the interviewees 
were asked how much information about the election they had received from the Chiefs, a measure of the 
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information channeled/controlled by the Leaders. Apart from this data, I also used the official electoral 
results of these locations as alternative outcome variables. 
Two estimation methods were employed to determine the impact of the main explanatory variables, 
described above, on voting behavior (turnout and voting patterns), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS). The application of the second method seeks to solve the problems of 
endogeneity associated with the use of perception explanatory variables. The instrument used was a 
measure of war victimization included in the survey, where the respondents reported the political force 
responsible for the potential death of a relative during the Mozambican civil war. This instrument finds 
support in Bellows and Miguel (2009) and in Blattman (2009) which provide empirical evidence for a 
positive correlation between war victimization and political and civic participation. Since the data base did 
not contain information identifying the Chiefs, they were proxied through the subject with highest social 
capital in each location. 
The estimations obtained through the OLS method point to a positive marginal impact of our indicators on 
both self-reported and official turnout, ranging from 1 to 5% in the first case and from 5 to 12% in the 
second. In addition to this, I identified positive marginal effects on the self-reported vote for 
Frelimo/Guebuza and on their official share of votes per location, ranging from 2 to 8% in the first case and 
from 2 to 4% in the second.  In both cases, I found statistically significant effects for the three types of 
indicators previously identified, direct proxies of the power of the Chiefs, measures of their interference 
during the election and indicators of the information they control. Concerning the estimations obtained 
through the 2SLS method, the marginal impacts found seem disproportionately large (some bigger than 
100%), possibly because this group of estimations was obtained using a considerably smaller sample. 
Nonetheless, the variables representing direct proxies of the power of the Chiefs present robust positive 
effects on all outcome variables previously mentioned with the exception of official turnout for which no 
significant impacts were found. 
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The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section 3 provides 
the political and historical context of this work. Section 4 presents the data base while section 5 describes the 
estimation strategy. Section 6 displays the econometric results and section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
This section presents a summary of the literature related to the present study. Many authors from the fields of 
sociology and anthropology have focused on the topic of African Traditional Authorities even though, few 
quantitative works have been released on this issue. Baldwin (2012), “Why Vote with the Chief? Political 
Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia” is perhaps one of the few exceptions. This study, 
based on an experiment randomizing information about the political preferences of the Chiefs across a 
group of voters, finds that the citizens might vote according to the preferences of the Leaders due to the 
belief that their communities might benefit in terms of provision of public goods from the relationship 
existing between the Chiefs and the candidates of their preference.  
This work also relates to the literature which explores the problems of fragile democracies, in particular with 
the studies of explicit electoral problems. Vicente (2010) provides empirical evidence from a field 
experiment in São Tome and Principe on the effectiveness of vote buying finding that vote buying increases 
turnout and the vote share of the challenger. Wantchekon (2003) shows, through a field experiment in Benin 
during the Presidential elections of 2001, that clientelistic “appeals” yield better results on average for all 
types of candidates, incumbents and challengers. Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su (2010) find that a 
campaign increasing the access of randomized voters to information on the performance of their elected 
representatives before a Regional election in India decreased the vote share of “worse performing 
incumbents”, reinforcing the idea that accountability increases with informed voters.  
In addition to this, it is associated with the growing literature on social networks, namely the influence of the 
traditional authorities on voting behavior studied here is likely to be determined by the social connections 
between the Leaders and the individuals of the respective communities. Nickerson (2008) studies intra-
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household peer effects on turnout through a randomized “Get Out the Vote” campaign in the US, finding 
large effects of contagion between targeted and non-targeted individuals. Gine and Mansuri (2011) show 
that the effects of a randomized door-to-door campaign focused on female turnout are very similar for the 
neighbors and close friends of the targeted women. Fafchamps and Vicente (2011) find that “kinship ties” 
are very effective in diffusing the effects of a campaign against political violence to non-targeted individuals 
and simultaneously in reinforcing the effects among targeted subjects. At last, Fafchamps, Vaz and Vicente 
(2012), exploring the same field experiment as the present study (Aker, Collier and Vicente, 2011), find that 
the peer effects of a campaign of voter education may also have a negative impact on political participation 
possibly due to the induction of free-riding. 
Finally, this work is also complementary to the studies about the ethnic “foundations” of political behavior. 
Posner (2004) provides empirical evidence, using the division of two ethnic groups by the administrative 
border between Zambia and Malawi as a natural experiment, that “political cleavage” between two different 
ethnicities is not an intrinsic condition but rather a phenomenon dependent on the “size of these groups 
relative to the size of the political arena in which they are located”. In the same spirit, Eifert, Miguel and 
Posner (2010) show that ethnic identification tends to increase with the “proximity” to an election and with 
the competitiveness of that election, using a broad data base including 10 different African countries. 
3. Context 
The General Peace Accords reached in Rome, in 1992, between Frelimo (which had lead the country since 
its independence, in 1975, under a single-party Socialist Regime) and Renamo (the opposition movement 
supported by the Apartheid  and Rhodesian Regimes) would end the armed conflict between these two 
forces bringing a multi-party political system to the country. Since then, 4 general elections have taken place 
in Mozambique (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009), all won by Frelimo. Despite this fact, Frelimo only achieved 
overwhelming majorities in the elections of 2004 and 2009 (62% and 75% respectively
1
). The results of the 
                                                          
1
 African Election Database - http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html 
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first two elections would actually give the impression of a competitive political system, namely in 1999, 
former President Chissano (from Frelimo) was almost defeated by Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo’s Leader) 
with a vote share of 52% against roughly 48% obtained by the opposition candidate. 
Many factors may have contributed to the radical change observed in Mozambique. Among them, there 
was drastic reduction of turnout from the first elections to the last two, dropping from an interval of 70 to 
90% to roughly 40%. In addition to this, Renamo was clearly harmed by the appearance of MDM 
(Movimento Democrático Moçambicano), a party born out of the secession of Daviz Simango, mayor of 
Beira (second biggest city of the country). Finally, the traditional authorities might have had some role in this 
phenomenon. 
As West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) recognize, the traditional leaders were instrumental to the Portuguese 
authorities during colonial rule in the collection of taxes and recruitment of labor in the rural areas. Due to 
this fact, when independence came, Frelimo decided to replace them by a new structure integrated in the 
spirit of the new socialist state (the so-called “Grupos Dinamizadores”). Nevertheless, the figure of the 
traditional leaders never “ceased to exist”, most importantly, Renamo, taking advantage of their discontent 
towards the ruling party, started to use them as base of support in the rural areas they controlled. This state of 
affairs lasted into the post-war period. As the afore-mentioned study points out, “within the context of the 
post-war (…) Mozambican state, those identified as traditional authorities (…) associate more easily with 
Renamo than with Frelimo”. Even though, it did not take long for Frelimo to realize the relevance of the 
Traditional Leaders within the new multiparty system. Actually, according to West and Kloeck-Jensen, 
“President Chissano (…) met with groups of former traditional leaders in several (…) Mozambican 
provinces in the months leading up the 1994 elections”. Moreover, as the same study points out, in June 
1995 returning from a meeting with former traditional authorities in Niassa, former President Chissano 
stated to the press: “We want traditional authority to exist”. Notwithstanding, the most important move to 
gain the support of the “Chiefs” would only be taken few months after the contested elections of 1999 with 
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the approval of decree 15/2000 in June 2000 reinstating the power of the Traditional Authorities over 
matters as diverse as the register of the population, the exploitation of land or even granting them a subsidy 
in exchange for assistance in tax collection just as during colonial times. 
4. Data 
The data base used for this study consists of the data collected through a household survey for Aker, Collier 
and Vicente (2011). This study was based on a field experiment conducted during the Mozambican general 
elections (parliamentary and presidential) of 2009 to measure the impact of electoral education interventions 
on voting behavior.  
The experiment comprised 4 groups of locations (enumeration areas) corresponding to three different 
treatments and a control group amounting to 161 locations in total. Two surveys were carried in each 
location, before and after the election (baseline and post-election). The three different interventions consisted 
of a civic education treatment, based on the distribution of a leaflet from the electoral commission, a 
treatment based on the distribution of a newspaper containing an electoral education message and on the 
dissemination of a cell phone hotline to which citizens could report electoral problems.  
The 161 enumeration areas were spread across four provinces, Cabo Delgado and Zambezia, in the north of 
the country, and Gaza and Maputo-Province in the south. The locations targeted by the experiment were 
selected according to a two-stage clustered representative sampling technique using the 2004 electoral map 
as the sampling framework (each enumeration area corresponds to a polling location). Clusters of 4 
enumeration areas, formed according to geographical proximity, were randomly selected using the number 
of registered voters in each cluster as weights. In sequence, the treatments were randomly assigned to one 
enumeration area in each cluster. Since the interventions required the use of cell phones, the polling locations 
without cell phone coverage were excluded from the pool of locations restricting the final sample. Within 
each enumeration area the experimental subjects were selected using a “standard household 
representativeness (    household)”.  In addition to this, the targeted individuals were “the household heads 
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or their spouses” with access to a cell phone. In each location, 11 individuals/households were interviewed 
during the baseline survey amounting to 1766 respondents. The post-election survey targeted the same 
respondents but due to attrition only 1154 were interviewed. 
The present study derives from the data collected through the post-election survey with exception to the 
demographic information and a measure of individual social capital included in the baseline survey. The 
post election survey included questions regarding the voting behavior of the respondents (turnout and voting 
patterns) and, as importantly, questions regarding the influence of the Traditional Leaders on several aspects 
of the respondents’ lives including their electoral behavior. In particular, the interviewees were asked how 
much information about the election they had received from the Leaders, how often they asked them for 
help, how often the Leaders’ had contacted with the respective communities during the year prior to the 
election, how much their daily life had depended on the Leaders’ decisions and how often they had agreed 
with the Leaders’ decisions during the same period. In addition to this, the respondents were asked to rate the 
level of responsibility of the Leaders over seven different matters from land allocation to the distribution of 
food. Finally, the interviewees were also asked to report whether they had met the Leader or his deputies 
during the election day and whether any of these persons had summoned them to vote.  Some other 
questions also proved to be useful, namely the respondents were asked to report whether they had lost any 
relatives during the civil war and the political force responsible for the death. All this questions were 
answered using “stepwise scales” introduced by the interviewer. 
In addition to this data source, I also used the official electoral results specified by enumeration area as 
alternative outcome variables. This included the share of votes obtained by each candidate/party and the 
turnout in percentage of total voters. 
5.  Estimation Strategy 
The main purpose of the econometric estimations of this study is to quantify the impact of different 
measures (proxies) of power of the traditional authorities on the voting behavior of the respective 
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communities. The main idea is that the Traditional Leaders might be interested in increasing turnout and the 
vote share of a certain political force, due to their political affiliation, a potential clientelistic relation with 
government officials or even with the purpose of increasing the provision of public goods to their 
communities by electing a certain candidate.  I used two different types of outcome variables, the self-
reported voting behavior and the electoral results per enumeration area (all of them are binary). For each 
type of outcome variable I used a different econometric specification. The specification used for the self-
reported outcome variables is described through the following expression: 
                   . (1) 
   represents the outcome variable at the individual level while   is the identifier of the individual.    
corresponds to the main explanatory variable and   is the effect of interest.    is a vector of three dummy 
variables controlling for the three treatments of Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).   is a vector of individual 
demographic controls. Note that there is no time identifier since all variables correspond to the post election 
survey, thus there is no time variation. 
In the regressions using the electoral results per enumeration area as dependent variable, the main 
explanatory variables and demographic controls were transformed to reflect the average of the respective 
location. In addition to this, given that these estimations featured the variation at the location level, a vector 
containing location controls is also included. The specification corresponding to these regressions is the 
following: 
                         (2) 
   represents the outcome variable at the location level while    is the location identifier.     corresponds to 
the main explanatory variable and    is the effect of interest once again.    is a vector of three dummy 
variables controlling for the three treatments of Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).     is a vector containing 
the averages of individual demographic controls per location and     is a vector of location controls. 
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Two different estimation methods were employed, ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares 
(2SLS). The Linear Probability Model (LPM) was preferred over the Logit estimation method despite its 
well-known shortfalls. The estimations obtained through the LPM model are not only easier to interpret as 
none of the marginal impacts of the main explanatory variables obtained through this method were bigger 
than one
2
 (quite the contrary). In addition to this, intuition does not point to a non-linear relation between the 
relative power of the traditional leaders and the voting behavior of their communities, if anything the 
marginal impact should grow with their power not the opposite. Moreover, the heteroskedasticity yielded by 
this method was corrected in the regressions featuring individual variation using standard errors clustered at 
the location level correcting as well for the correlation between individuals belonging to the same 
enumeration area. In the second type of estimations, this problem was solved using robust standard errors. 
Finally, the LPM also allows comparability with the estimations obtained through 2SLS. 
The employment of the 2SLS method is justified by the endogeneity of the main explanatory variables. The 
endogeneity of the variables of interest might be a consequence of both omitted variable bias and 
measurement error. On the one hand, there are several factors that may influence the voting behavior of the 
individuals of the sample that cannot be observed or for which there is no available information. On the 
other hand, given that the main independent variables are perceptions from the respondents of the survey, 
the measures are very likely to suffer from response bias. The instrument used finds support in the literature 
of civil conflict specifically, in Bellows and Miguel (2009) and Blattman (2009). Bellows and Miguel 
(2009) found that war victims in Sierra Leone, namely individuals that lost relatives during the civil war, 
“are much more active civic and political participants than non-victims”. Blattman (2009) found that the 
children “abducted” to Joseph Kony’s army in Uganda are much more likely to vote and perform 
community leadership roles later on due to the violence they witnessed (perpetrating violence does not have 
a statistically significant impact). These findings lead me to instrument the several measures of power of the 
                                                          
2
 To ensure the robustness of the results obtained, I also estimated them using the logit model obtaining 
very similar results. These estimations are not presented in this study. 
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traditional leaders through their experience of the civil war. The main hypothesis is that war victimization is 
positively correlated with the current power of Leaders, as the literature mentioned points out, but not 
correlated with the voting behavior of the individuals of our sample, respecting the exclusion restriction.  
Since the survey did not have information identifying the traditional leaders I used the individual with 
highest social capital in each location as a proxy (when more than one individual shared the highest score I 
took a simple average). Social capital was measured through the aggregation of three questions in which the 
respondents were asked to report their role in religious groups, unions and local organizations (the scale went 
from non-member to leader). The average age of the individuals with the highest social capital per location 
in 2009 was 40 years old (the median was 38) implying that they were 23 years old on average in 1992 
when the civil war ended. In this way, the hypothesis that their leadership positions could have been largely 
determined previously to the civil war is ruled out reassuring the idea behind the instrument. To measure 
war victimization I used the answer of these individuals to a question where they were asked to report if they 
had lost any relative during the civil war and which political force was responsible for the loss. This variable 
may also be subject to some response bias but since the answers do not imply any rating on a subjective 
scale it should not be significant. 
     6.   Econometric Results (All tables mentioned in this section may be found in the Appendix)  
     6.1. Descriptive Statistics  
I begin the presentation of the econometric results of this study introducing the descriptive statistics of the 
demographics and main outcome and explanatory variables of the sample. Table 1 presents the main 
demographics and the location characteristics that were used as controls in the estimations. As the table 
depicts the average respondent was 38 years old and only had elementary education (level 2). Only 25% of 
them had paid jobs whereas the average daily expenditure per household was 128 Meticais. The main 
religions represented in the sample were catholic (36%), protestant (35%) and muslim (22%) while the 
main ethnicities were Changana (36% ), Macua (22%), Lomue (10%) and Chuabo (10%). 
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Table 2 presents the main outcome and explanatory variables. The table presents both the self-reported 
voting patterns and the electoral results per enumeration area. As the table shows, 91% of the respondents 
reported to have voted. The difference with the official turnout at the location level is striking, on average 
only 47% of the voters went to the polls.  As the figures indicate roughly 85% of the respondents reported to 
have voted for Frelimo and Armando Guebuza (Frelimo’s presidential candidate). The electoral results at 
the location level do not differ much from these numbers, on average 81% of the voters of the locations 
where the survey was conducted voted for Frelimo and Armando Guebuza. Actually, Renamo, the main 
opposition party, only had a larger voting share than Frelimo in 4 of the 161 enumeration areas. These 
numbers substantiate the estimation strategy used for some of the effects that will be presented in the next 
subsections. Given that the overwhelming majority of the respondents and the large majority of the voters of 
the locations featured in this study present a very strong preference for the ruling party (Frelimo), I only 
present the estimations where the turnout and the vote for Frelimo or its Presidential candidate serve as 
outcome variables. Moreover, in such a scenario it is not outrageous to assume that the traditional leaders of 
these locations were affiliated or had a preference for Frelimo. In this way, it is reasonable to regress the vote 
for Frelimo or Guebuza directly on our variables of interest without any interaction with the potential 
political affiliation of the Chiefs. 
Table 2 also describes the main explanatory variables. They are divided in three groups. The first group 
includes six variables that are direct proxies of the power of the Tradional Leaders, three variables where the 
respondents were asked to report the responsibility of the leaders over land allocation, conflict resolution and 
the distribution of food and seeds for agriculture, one variable where the interviewees were asked to indicate 
their level of dependence on the decisions of the Chiefs, other reporting the assistance of traditional 
authorities to the community in the resolution of problems (in a scale of 0-3)  and finally one variable 
reporting the level of agreement of the interviewees with the decisions of the chiefs (in a scale of 0-6). The 
second group includes two variables that are potential measures of the interference of the Chiefs during the 
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election day (“met the chief or the sub-chief during election day”). At last, the third group includes one 
variable which is a potential indicator of the information controlled or channeled by the Leaders, a variable 
indicating the amount of information about the election the respondents received from the Chief. This group 
of nine variables was chosen because it is comprehensive of the several dimensions of the potential 
influence of the traditional authorities on the voting behavior of the respective communities.  
     6.2.   Voter Turnout and Voting Patterns (OLS) 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the estimated marginal impacts of the main explanatory variables on self-reported 
voter turnout and on the official turnout of the parliamentary and presidential elections per polling station.  
Only the effect of the variable reporting the amount of information about the election received from the 
traditional leader is robust across the three formulations (significant at the 10% level on the first specification 
and at the 1% level on the other two) with a marginal impact of 2% on self-reported turnout and roughly 
12% on official turnout. The two variables reporting whether the respondents met the Chief or his deputy 
during election day are both significant at the 1% level in the first formulation, having the largest marginal 
impact on self-reported turnout among the variables considered (5%). Even though, this effect does not hold 
when measured at the location level using the official turnout as outcome variable. Concerning the first 
group of variables, including direct proxies of the power of the Chiefs, three out of the 6 measures are 
significant in at least one of the formulations. The variables indicating the responsibility of the Chiefs’ over 
land allocation and over the distribution of food and seeds for agriculture, only have significant coefficients 
on the regressions using official turnout at the location level as outcome (at the 5% level), however only the 
second one has a robust effect across the two specifications. The variable reporting the dependence of the 
respondents on the decisions of the Chiefs has conflicting effects with a positive and significant coefficient 
on self-reported turnout and a significant negative marginal impact on the official turnout of the presidential 
elections  (at the 10% level). However, a careful comparison of tables 4 and 5 denotes that the negative 
marginal impact of this variable should not be overvalued. These two specifications use two outcome 
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variables that are only slightly different (the difference between the turnout on the parliamentary and 
presidential elections is residual, given that the electors voted for the two at the same time), even though the 
negative coefficient of this variable is only significant (at the 10% level) in the second case.  
The estimated effects of our variables on the vote for Frelimo (self-reported and location results) are 
presented by tables 6 and 7. Among the direct proxies of the Chiefs’ power, three variables have significant 
and positive marginal impacts on either the self reported vote for Frelimo or on its electoral results at the 
location level. The marginal impact corresponding to the level of dependence of the respondents on the 
decisions of the Leaders is robust across both specifications (significant at the 1% level and 10% levels 
respectively). The coefficient corresponding to the Chiefs’ responsibility over the distribution of food and 
seeds is only significant (at the 5% level) on the first specification while the variable reporting the 
respondents’ agreement with the decisions of the chief has significant positive effect, at the 1% level, on the 
vote share at the location level. The two variables belonging to the second group only have significant 
positive effects on the self-reported vote, one at the 1% level (“met the sub-chief on the election day”) and 
the other at the 5% level (“met the chief on the election day”). As before these variables have the largest 
marginal impacts on the self-reported vote between 5 and 7%. Finally, the measure reporting the amount of 
information about the election received from the leader has significant positive effect (at the 10% level) on 
the self-reported vote. 
Finally, tables 8 and 9 display the results of our estimations using the vote for Armando Guebuza (self-
reported and per location) as an outcome variable. Among the 6 variables representing direct proxies of the 
Leader’s power, three are statistically significant in the first specification and two on the second. However, 
only one is common to both formulations. The variable which shows consistent effects is the dependence of 
the respondents on the decisions of the Leaders, significant at the 1% level on the first formulation and at the 
10% level on the second. The coefficients corresponding to the responsibility of the Leaders over the 
distribution of food and seeds and to their level of assistance in the resolution of problems of the community 
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have positive marginal impacts on the self-reported vote at the 5% level. In addition to this, the marginal 
impacts related to the respondents’ agreement with their decisions is significant in the second specification at 
the 1% levels respectively. The variables reporting the interference of the traditional authorities during 
election day only have significant impacts on the self-reported vote for Guebuza (both at the 1% level). 
Lastly, the indicator of the amount of information about the election received from the Leaders is significant 
at the 5% level in the first specification but not on the second. Similarly to the previous cases, the magnitude 
of the marginal impacts on these outcome variables lies between 2 and 8%.  
Summarizing the results presented in this section we are able to identify some patterns. Within the first 
group of variables, understood as direct proxies of the power of the traditional authorities, the variable 
reporting the level of dependence of the respondents on the decisions of the traditional leaders seems to have 
a robust positive impact on turnout and on the vote for Frelimo and Guebuza. The only exception seems to 
be the formulation using the official turnout of the presidential elections as the outcome, where it presents a 
significant negative marginal impact, which does not seem to be a very reliable result as I had the 
opportunity to point out. In addition to this, the variable indicating the responsibility of the Traditional 
Leaders over the distribution of food and seeds for agriculture also presents relatively robust effects with 
significant and positive marginal impacts in the specifications using the official turnout at the location level 
and the self-reported vote for Frelimo and Guebuza as outcomes. Moreover, the variable reporting the level 
of agreement of the respondents with the decisions of the Chiefs has significant and positive coefficients in 
the specifications using the electoral results of Frelimo and Guebuza as dependent variables. Interpreting 
these results within the scope of the first group of variables, it seems reasonable that a variable reporting the 
direct dependence of respondents on the leaders and a variable indicating their responsibility over an 
essential resource should have stronger effects.  Furthermore, it also seems logical that variable which in 
some sense reflects the “support” of the communities to their Leaders presents robust impacts. Regarding 
the variables indicating the direct interference of the Leaders during the election day, they present the 
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marginal effects with the highest levels of statistical significance and highest magnitude in the formulations 
which use the self-reported outcomes. Even though, this effects do not hold in the specifications using the 
official results at the location level as outcomes. Finally, the variable reporting the information controlled by 
the Leaders, presents very consistent results. This variable has positive statistically significant effects on all 
the specifications of turnout and on the specifications using the self-reported vote for Frelimo and Guebuza 
as outcome. In addition to this, the effects of this variable on turnout seem to be considerably large (12 to 
13%). There seems to be some inconsistency between the results obtained for the self-reported outcomes 
and the electoral results. The fact that our sample is only representative of the population which uses cell-
phones is a possible explanation. Even though, the effects described point to a positive correlation between 
the power of the traditional leaders and our measures of turnout and vote for Frelimo and Armando 
Guebuza. If we believe the Chiefs have a preference for Frelimo (for reasons aforementioned in this study) it 
is reasonable to expect them to exert their influence to increase the vote in this party. This effect would 
obviously increase with their power. 
     6.3.   Voter Turnout and Voting Patterns (2SLS) 
This section presents the estimations obtained through the 2SLS estimation method. As explained in section 
5, the variable used as instrument reports which political force was responsible for the death of a relative by 
the individuals with the highest social capital in each location (proxies of the Leaders). This variable took a 
score one when the political force responsible for the loss was Renamo and zero when the responsible was 
Frelimo. Even though not presented in this document, the first stage relation between the great majority of 
the main explanatory variables and the instrument was positive as expected. This means that there is a 
positive correlation between current “power” of the Leaders and the loss of a relative during the civil war 
perpetrated by Renamo. This makes sense given the extreme preference for Frelimo of the locations 
included in the sample as demonstrated in section 6.1. The use of this variable as an instrument caused a 
sharp decrease in the number of observations of the sample, in particular the regressions using the electoral 
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results as outcome variables were left with 47 observations. This factor should be taken into account when 
analyzing the results.  
Tables 10 and 11 depict the marginal impacts of our main variables on the vote for Frelimo (self-reported 
and at the location level). Among the direct proxies of the Chiefs’ power, five present positive statistically 
significant marginal impacts on the self-reported vote for Frelimo even though, only two of those are also 
significant in the second specification. The Leader’s level of assistance to the community in the resolution of 
problems has a significant and positive marginal impact on both outcome variables, scoring higher than 10 
(the rule of thumb for this test) in the weak identification test in the first specification. The coefficient 
corresponding to level of responsibility of the Chiefs over conflict resolution is also positive and statistically 
significant in both specifications however, it only scores 5 and 1 on the weak identification tests. The 
variables indicating the Leader’s responsibility over the allocation of land and the level of agreement of the 
respondents with their decisions have significant and positive marginal impacts on the self-reported outcome 
(at the 10% and 1% levels respectively) with a scores of 14 and 8 on the weak identification test. 
Unexpectedly, the coefficient of the variable indicating the responsibility of the Leaders over the distribution 
of food and seeds is negative and statistically significant with a score of 7 on the weak identification test for 
the first specification. The marginal impact of the variable reporting whether the respondents met the Chief 
on election day is also statistically significant and positive for both outcome variables (at the 1% level) 
nevertheless it only scores 3 and 5 on the weak identification test. The variable belonging to the third group 
does not present statistically significant impacts in any of the formulations.  Concerning the size of the 
marginal impacts they appear to be considerably large when compared with the results obtained with the 
OLS estimation method, namely the two variables with a score higher than 10 on the weak identification 
test in the formulation using the self-reported vote for Frelimo, present marginal impacts of approximately 
76% and 47% respectively. When interpreting these results tough, we should bear in mind that the 
estimation method employed does not bound the estimations to the 0-1 interval. 
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Tables 12 and 13 display the estimations obtained using the vote for Guebuza as outcome variable. Within 
the first group of variables, only two have consistent significant positive effects on both outcomes. These 
coefficients correspond to the Chief’s assistance to the community and to the variable indicating the 
responsibility of the Leaders’ on the resolution of conflicts. Even though, only the first variable on the first 
specification has a score higher than 10 on the weak identification test. The marginal impact of the variable 
where the respondents report their agreement with the decisions of the Leader is also significant and positive 
for the self-reported outcome at the 1% level with a weak identification test of approximately 8. As before, 
the coefficient corresponding to the responsibility of the Chiefs over the distribution of food and seeds is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level and with a score on the weak identification test of 7. In 
addition to this, the coefficient of the variable indicating whether the respondents met the chief on election 
day remains significant at the 1% level for both outcome variables with scores of 4 and 5 on the weak 
identification test. The variable belonging to the third group, does not present statistically significant impacts 
in any of the formulations as in the previous case. Concerning the size of the marginal impacts, the pattern 
highlighted before remains, namely the only variable which had a score higher than 10 on the weak 
identification test and a statistically significant effect has a marginal impact of 42%. 
Finally, table 14 presents the effects of the main explanatory variables on self-reported turnout. Only the 
coefficient of the variable reporting the assistance of the Leaders to the community is simultaneously 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) with a score on the weak identification test higher than 10. The 
variables reporting the responsibility of the Leaders over the resolution of conflicts and the agreement of the 
respondents with their decisions are both significant at the 1% level with scores on the weak identification 
test of 7 and 9 respectively. The variable reporting the responsibility of the Chiefs over land allocation is 
significant and positive at the 5% level with a score on the weak identification test of approximately 6 while 
the variable reporting the responsibility of the Leaders over the distribution of food and seeds has a negative 
and statistically significant marginal impact as reported before (weak identification test of 7). In addition to 
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this, both variables belonging to the second group are statistically significant (at 10% and 1% levels) with 
scores of 2 and 5 on the weak identification test. Regarding the effects on the official turnout at the location 
level no statistically significant impact was found. Due to the restrictions of space, the respective table is not 
presented in this document. The pattern of large marginal impacts noted before is also verified in this case. 
To conclude, it is clear that the instrument works much better with the self-reported outcome variables than 
with the official results at the location level. The main reasons seem to be the reduced sample of the second 
group of estimations and the problem of representativeness of the sample as mentioned before. In addition to 
this, the results are undoubtedly better for the first group of variables including direct proxies of the power of 
the Traditional Leaders. This was to be expected, the concept of the instrument was to explain the current 
levels of power and participation of the Leaders, not their interference during the election day or the 
information they control even though interconnected. Among the 6 variables of the first group the variable 
reporting the level of assistance of the Leaders to their communities has the most reliable results with 
statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level or higher and scores on the weak identification test 
consistently above 10% on the regressions with self-reported outcome variables. At a lower level, the 
variables reporting the agreement of the respondents with the Leaders’ decisions and the responsibilities of 
the Leaders over the allocation of land and resolution of conflicts present reasonable results with scores 
bellow 10 on the weak identification test but still rather high. The variable indicating the responsibility of the 
Chiefs over the distribution of food and seeds presents an odd result with consistent negative statistically 
significant marginal impacts across the specifications featuring the self-reported outcomes. It is difficult to 
conciliate this result with intuition, in particular when compared with the other variables of the same group 
and with the results obtained with the OLS estimation method. All in all, even if the size of the marginal 
effects presented in this section seems disproportionate, the results presented certainly point to a likely causal 
relation when taken together with the results of the previous section. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This work had the purpose of assessing whether the Traditional Authorities had any influence on the voting 
behavior of rural communities in Mozambique and to quantify this relation. The results presented point to a 
positive correlation between their power, measured through a wide range of indicators, turnout and the vote 
share of the incumbent, Frelimo.  However, given the large difference between the size of the effects 
determined through the two estimation methods employed here, it is difficult to take any conclusions on the 
true magnitude of this influence. Nonetheless, we can reasonably conclude that Traditional Leaders have 
some power over the electoral results of their communities.  
The data available for this study only allowed me to demonstrate a positive correlation between the power of 
the Traditional Authorities and the electoral results of the incumbent. However, this does not imply that this 
pattern is not verified for the challengers as well. To better understand this phenomenon, a broader database 
representative of the Mozambican political spectrum would be necessary. Moreover, the instrumental 
variable approach used in this work does not allow us to establish an irrefutable causal relation. An 
experimental approach is perhaps the only way to circumvent the problem. 
The power the Traditional Leaders hold make them very liable of being corrupted or manipulated to 
influence electoral results in one way or the other. In the future, policy should seek to increase their 
independence from political actors and at the same time to increase their accountability towards the 
communities they represent. In this way, we might guarantee that these entities only use their power and 
influence in the best interest of the ones they stand for. 
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Variable      Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
male 0,451 0,498 0 1
age 37,596 13,584 15 88
school (0-9) 2,448 1,721 0 8
job 0,251 0,434 0 1
expenditure 128,722 163,958 0 2380,952
catholic 0,361 0,480 0 1
protestant 0,352 0,478 0 1
muslim 0,222 0,416 0 1
chang 0,359 0,480 0 1
macua 0,215 0,411 0 1
lomue 0,095 0,294 0 1
chuabo 0,096 0,295 0 1
admnistrative post 0,117 0,321 0 1
police station 0,490 0,500 0 1
water supply 0,293 0,455 0 1
health center 0,648 0,478 0 1
electricity supply 0,557 0,497 0 1
sewage 0,185 0,388 0 1
recreation 0,750 0,433 0 1
temple 0,929 0,257 0 1
meetroom 0,342 0,475 0 1
market 0,784 0,412 0 1
internet 0,071 0,257 0 1
police 0,242 0,428 0 1
Enumeration 
Area 
Characteristics
Ethnicity
Religion
Basic 
Demographics
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Demographics and Location Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0,913 0,281 0 1
0,853 0,354 0 1
0,846 0,361 0 1
0,469 0,135 0,225 1
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Land 
allocation        
(0-3)
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Conflict 
resolution       
(0-3)
1,866 0,922 0 3
Food and 
seeds 
distribution    
(0-3)
0,521 0,894 0 3
2,202 2,401 0 6
0,996 0,935 0 3
3,376 1,850 0 7
0,509 0,500 0 1
0,382 0,486 0 1
0,680 0,854 0 2
Turnout
Frelimo
Guebusa
Table2: Descriptive Statistics - Outcomes and Main Explanatory Variables
Frelimo
Guebuza
Chiefs' 
responsabilities
Electoral 
Results per 
Location 
(percentage)
Main 
Explanatory 
Variables
Turnout Parliament Elections
Turnout Presidential Elections
Respondents' dependence on 
Chiefs' decisions (0-6)
Chiefs' level of assistance to 
the community (0-3)
Respondents' agreement with 
Chiefs' decisions (0-6)
Met Sub-Chief on election day 
(0-1)
Met Chief on election day (0-1)
Information about election 
received from the Chief (0-2)
Self-
Reported 
Outcomes   
(0-1)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,004 -0,001 0,006 0,011** 0,009 0,001
(0,009) (0,009) (0,009) (0,004) (0,009) (0,004)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,052*** 0,050***
(0,017) (0,016)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,021*
(0,011)
constant 0,862*** 0,866*** 0,876*** 0,818*** 0,868*** 0,862*** 0,874*** 0,850*** 0,849***
(0,060) (0,062) (0,057) (0,063) (0,059) (0,063) (0,057) (0,059) (0,061)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 1.006 1.040 973 1.054 996 1.034 1.022 935 1.053
Adjusted R2 0,018 0,019 0,022 0,021 0,012 0,017 0,034 0,028 0,020
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are perception variables reported by 
the respondents as well. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity 
dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  
Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table3: Self-Reported Turnout
Voter Turnout
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsibilities: Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,045* 0,003 0,055* -0,013 -0,019 0,013
(0,026) (0,025) (0,032) (0,014) (0,021) (0,015)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,006 -0,024
(0,061) (0,046)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,129***
(0,042)
constant 0,496*** 0,542*** 0,517*** 0,655*** 0,598*** 0,436* 0,542*** 0,570*** 0,470***
(0,181) (0,189) (0,179) (0,206) (0,195) (0,232) (0,191) (0,188) (0,173)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Adjusted R2 0,505 0,489 0,507 0,495 0,491 0,492 0,489 0,490 0,545
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is the voter turnout of the national parliament election in percentage of total voters per ballot station 
(enumeration area). Explanatory variables are averages of perception variables per enumeration area. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, 
employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline 
controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011). EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an 
admnistrative post, police station, water supply, health center, electricity, sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads.  
Robust standard errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Turnout - Parliament Election (Location)
Voter Turnout - Parliament Election
Main Explanatory Variables  (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsibilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,039 0,013 0,058* -0,020* -0,030 0,014
(0,026) (0,024) (0,031) (0,012) (0,021) (0,015)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,009 -0,020
(0,061) (0,045)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,122***
(0,041)
constant 0,468*** 0,490*** 0,480*** 0,682*** 0,592*** 0,386* 0,504*** 0,531*** 0,439***
(0,174) (0,181) (0,171) (0,196) (0,186) (0,222) (0,183) (0,181) (0,166)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Adjusted R2 0,519 0,507 0,527 0,522 0,513 0,510 0,506 0,507 0,559
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is the voter turnout for the presidential election in percentage of total voters per ballot station (enumeration 
area). Explanatory variables are averages of perception variables per enumeration area. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment 
status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the 
treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011). EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an admnistrative post, 
police station, water supply, health center, electricity, sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads.  Robust standard 
errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Turnout - Presidential Election (location)
Voter Turnout - Presidential Election
Main Explanatory Variables  (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsibilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,007 0,008 0,028** 0,021*** 0,016 -0,005
(0,011) (0,013) (0,012) (0,005) (0,013) (0,006)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,066*** 0,052**
(0,021) (0,022)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,023*
(0,014)
constant 0,794*** 0,787*** 0,808*** 0,743*** 0,794*** 0,822*** 0,782*** 0,763*** 0,785***
(0,082) (0,084) (0,082) (0,079) (0,083) (0,082) (0,081) (0,084) (0,082)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 942 973 914 983 933 968 948 874 981
Adjusted R2 0,029 0,027 0,032 0,042 0,026 0,028 0,046 0,041 0,029
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are perception variables reported by 
the respondents as well. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity 
dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  
Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6:  Vote for Frelimo - Self-Reported
Vote for Frelimo
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution         
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power -0,000 0,034 0,019 0,016* 0,012 0,040***
(0,017) (0,025) (0,020) (0,009) (0,017) (0,013)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,003 0,037
(0,055) (0,046)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,028
(0,031)
constant 0,712*** 0,655*** 0,701*** 0,577*** 0,681*** 0,367** 0,709*** 0,678*** 0,695***
(0,145) (0,148) (0,143) (0,162) (0,154) (0,175) (0,151) (0,148) (0,144)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Adjusted R2 0,735 0,740 0,737 0,743 0,736 0,761 0,735 0,737 0,737
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is the share of votes of Guebuza per ballot station (enumeration area). Explanatory variables are averages of 
perception variables per enumeration area. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion 
and ethnicity dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente 
(2011). EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an admnistrative post, police station, water supply, health center, electricity, 
sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads.  Robust standard errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7:  Vote for Frelimo (Location)
Vote for Frelimo
Main Explanatory Variables (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions     
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions     
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day (0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day (0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received from 
the Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,012 0,022 0,026** 0,026*** 0,029** -0,000
(0,010) (0,014) (0,013) (0,005) (0,013) (0,006)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,078*** 0,057***
(0,021) (0,021)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,031**
(0,014)
constant 0,824*** 0,798*** 0,827*** 0,761*** 0,820*** 0,843*** 0,813*** 0,804*** 0,815***
(0,084) (0,087) (0,087) (0,083) (0,086) (0,086) (0,083) (0,089) (0,085)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 929 961 901 969 923 955 935 864 967
Adjusted R2 0,037 0,036 0,033 0,057 0,035 0,035 0,063 0,046 0,039
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are perception variables reported by 
the respondents as well. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity 
dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  
Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Vote for Guebuza - Self-Reported
Vote for Guebuza
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution         
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,005 0,040 0,017 0,017* 0,018 0,042***
(0,017) (0,027) (0,020) (0,009) (0,018) (0,013)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
0,001 0,039
(0,048) (0,047)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,015
(0,028)
constant 0,752*** 0,692*** 0,749*** 0,616*** 0,710*** 0,395** 0,757*** 0,722*** 0,749***
(0,144) (0,146) (0,142) (0,160) (0,153) (0,172) (0,150) (0,147) (0,143)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Adjusted R2 0,730 0,738 0,732 0,739 0,732 0,760 0,730 0,733 0,731
Note: All regressions are OLS. The dependent variable is the share of votes of Guebuza per ballot station (enumeration area). Explanatory variables are averages of 
perception variables per enumeration area. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, 
religion and ethnicity dummies. Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and 
Vicente (2011). EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an admnistrative post, police station, water supply, health center, 
electricity, sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads. Robust standard errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Vote for Guebuza (Location)
Vote for Guebuza
Main Explanatory Variables (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day (0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day (0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,759* 0,755*** -1,429** -0,657 0,446** 0,472***
(0,448) (0,206) (0,579) (1,250) (0,180) (0,179)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
4,196 1,055***
(4,245) (0,300)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
4,361
(14,499)
constant -0,162 -0,370 1,536*** 4,245 0,442 -0,650 -1,729 0,572** -3,280
(0,714) (0,458) (0,408) (5,971) (0,284) (0,736) (2,733) (0,257) (14,522)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 363 376 354 377 363 373 369 343 378
Weak identification test 14.173 5.272 6.991  0.454 17.301 8.040  0.464 3.441 0.065
Adjusted R2 -5,021 -3,925 -12,632 -21,029 -1,129 -6,351 -36,088 -2,001 -103,667
Note: All regressions are 2SLS.   Turnout is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are instrumented with a variable which tell us 
whether the individual with highest social capital per enumeration area had relatives killed by Renamo during the civil war. Demographic controls include age, 
gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity dummies . Treatments include the variables civic education, 
newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at 
the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Vote for Frelimo - Self-Reported (2SLS)
Vote for Frelimo
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 2,057 0,282** -4,264 0,175 0,138** 0,899
(6,349) (0,128) (33,175) (0,150) (0,057) (2,566)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
1,493 0,301***
(1,571) (0,108)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,772
(0,493)
constant -3,155 0,568 17,624 -0,171 0,563 -9,104 1,276** 1,047*** -0,302
(13,620) (0,382) (127,645) (1,279) (0,348) (29,522) (0,550) (0,198) (1,030)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Weak identification test  0.028 1.432   0.005  0.562 5.224 0.032 0.242 5.141  0.541
Adjusted R2 -19,116 0,562 -126,784 -0,554 0,640 -16,196 -1,335 0,727 0,141
Note: All regressions are 2SLS.  The dependent variable is the share of votes of Frelimo per ballot station (enumeration area). Explanatory variables (averages per 
enumeration area) are instrumented with a variable which tell us whether the individual with highest social capital per enumeration area had relatives killed by 
Renamo during the civil war. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and 
ethnicity dummies . Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente 
(2011).  EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an admnistrative post, police station, water supply, health center, electricity, 
sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads. Standard errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Vote for Frelimo - location (2SLS)
Vote for Frelimo
Main Explanatory Variables (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,725 0,724*** -1,302** -0,603 0,419** 0,458**
(0,483) (0,219) (0,524) (1,158) (0,189) (0,202)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
3,875 0,933***
(3,674) (0,259)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
4,814
(19,432)
constant -0,059 -0,276 1,499*** 4,070 0,514* -0,558 -1,509 0,665*** -3,733
(0,761) (0,455) (0,372) (5,607) (0,290) (0,804) (2,392) (0,227) (19,591)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 362 375 353 375 361 372 367 341 376
Weak identification test 12.362 5.120 7.349  0.469 17.264 7.625  0.479 3.599 0.045
Adjusted R2 -4,243 -3,393 -10,314 -17,397 -0,876 -5,722 -29,393 -1,457 -122,206
Note: All regressions are 2SLS. Turnout is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are instrumented with a variable which tell us 
whether the individual with highest social capital per enumeration area had relatives killed by Renamo during the civil war. Demographic controls include age, 
gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity dummies . Treatments include the variables civic education, 
newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at 
the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: IV - Vote for Guebuza - Self-Reported (2SLS)
Vote for Guebuza
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
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Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 1,791 0,245** -3,712 0,152 0,120** 0,783
(5,589) (0,113) (28,743) (0,133) (0,049) (2,247)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
1,300 0,262***
(1,355) (0,093)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
0,673
(0,452)
constant -2,470 0,772** 15,622 0,128 0,767** -7,650 1,388*** 1,188*** 0,014
(11,991) (0,336) (110,593) (1,133) (0,299) (25,850) (0,474) (0,170) (0,944)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
E.A. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Weak identification test  0.028 1.432  0.005  0.562 5.224  0.032  0.242 5.141  0.541
Adjusted R2 -15,450 0,644 -100,204 -0,285 0,719 -12,910 -0,832 0,788 0,238
Note: All regressions are 2SLS.  The dependent variable is the share of votes of Guebuza per ballot station (enumeration area). Explanatory variables (averages per 
enumeration area) are instrumented with a variable which tell us whether the individual with highest social capital per enumeration area had relatives killed by 
Renamo during the civil war. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and 
ethnicity dummies . Treatments include the variables civic education, newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente 
(2011).  EA controls include enumeration area characteristics namely the existence of an admnistrative post, police station, water supply, health center, electricity, 
sewage, recreation center, temples, meetrooms, markets, internet, army  bases and roads. Standard errors reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Vote for Guebuza - location (2SLS)
Vote for Guebuza
Main Explanatory Variables (averages per enumeration area)
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
Dependent Variable     ---------->
Land 
allocation 
(0-3)
Conflict 
resolution 
(0-3)
Food and 
seeds 
distribution 
(0-3)
Sub-groups of explanatory variables coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proxies of Chiefs' power 0,954** 0,537*** -1,067*** -0,402 0,327*** 0,309***
(0,400) (0,162) (0,342) (0,594) (0,078) (0,103)
Chiefs' interference during election 
day
1,727* 0,778***
(0,942) (0,216)
Information channeled/controled by 
the Chief
-4,938
(38,124)
constant -0,493 -0,076 1,437*** 2,725 0,606*** -0,128 -0,140 0,634*** 6,370
(0,640) (0,354) (0,313) (2,541) (0,143) (0,421) (0,674) (0,168) (41,219)
Treatments yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 386 398 374 400 384 395 392 364 401
Weak identification test 5.595 6.670 6.575  0.654 13.937 8.661 1.778 5.336 0.017
Adjusted R2 -12,230 -3,284 -11,596 -12,070 -0,905 -4,476 -9,844 -1,732 -222,874
Note: All regressions are 2SLS.   Turnout is a dummy (0-1) reported by the respondents. Explanatory variables are instrumented with a variable which tell us 
whether the individual with highest social capital per enumeration area had relatives killed by Renamo during the civil war. Demographic controls include age, 
gender, years of education, employment status, household monthly expenditure, religion and ethnicity dummies . Treatments include the variables civic education, 
newspaper and hotline controlling for the treatments conducted for Aker, Collier and Vicente (2011).  Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at 
the location (enumeration area) level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Turnout - Self-Reported (2SLS)
Voter Turnout
Main Explanatory Variables
Chiefs' responsabilities:
Respondents' 
dependence 
on Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Chiefs' 
level of 
assistance 
to the 
community 
(0-3)
Respondents' 
agreement 
with Chiefs' 
decisions      
(0-6)
Met Sub-
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Met 
Chief on 
election 
day        
(0-1)
Information 
about 
election 
received 
from the 
Chief (0-2)
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
